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The Example of Barbara Johnson

Twenty-five years ago the first explicitly feminist issue of Critical Inquiry (Winter
1981), called “Writing and Sexual Difference,” opened with an epigraph from Barbara
Johnson’s The Critical Difference (1980):
If human beings were not divided into two biological sexes, there would probably
be no need for literature. And if literature could truly say what the relations
between the sexes are, we would doubtless not need much of it then, either. . . .
It is not the life of sexuality that literature cannot capture; it is literature that
inhabits the very heart of what makes sexuality problematic for us speaking
animals. Literature is not only a thwarted investigator but also an incorrigible
perpetrator of the problem of sexuality. (173)
Elizabeth Abel, editor of this special issue and author of the introduction in which this
quotation appears, never comments directly on the epigraph, nor does she mention
Barbara Johnson by name in her introduction, though with the hindsight of a quarter
century, we can see that Abel’s second sentence, “Deconstructive criticism has made
us attend to notions of textual difference,” indirectly addresses Johnson; for over the
years, Johnson’s name has become identified with deconstruction. But that connection
could hardly have been apparent to many readers then when Johnson’s first book had
only recently been published.1 Perhaps another place where hindsight might have us
locate Barbara Johnson in this introduction is the last sentence of the first paragraph, for
there Abel states that the volume presents the “scope of feminist inquiry” in essays that
focus on the various ways sexual difference figures in the study of literary texts. And
yet, would Johnson have been identified with feminism in 1981 given that her first book
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focused on male writers and, as Abel says, difference had “only recently emerged as a
focus of feminist criticism” (1)? It strikes me as significant that the first feminist issue of
what is arguably the most prominent journal in literary theory begins with Barbara
Johnson, and yet the significance of that epigraph remains opaque, raising the question
of just why and how Barbara Johnson serves as an example in this text.
This question is taken up by Jane Gallop in “The Difference Within” (1982), her
response to Abel’s special issue.2 Gallop presents a close reading of the epigraph from
Johnson, but quickly turns (in deconstructive fashion) from trying to figure out what the
statement means to questioning its function within the volume. Johnson’s presence in
this special issue, Gallop suggests, serves not just to illustrate but to produce the effects
of “the difference within,” the very concept with which Johnson is now most clearly
identified.3 The epigraph, Gallop says, functions as “a dis-Abel-ing ‘difference within’ the
entire issue” (13), subverting “the very idea of identity,” such as the identity “feminist”
that the volume represents (13). Commenting on the fact that Abel leaves the epigraph
unexplained, Gallop notes the difference between what Johnson says in that epigraph
and what Abel says in the sentence that comes closet to explaining the relation of the
epigraph to the special issue: “The analysis of female talent grappling with a male
tradition,” writes Abel, “translates sexual difference into literary differences” (2).4 Gallop
responds, “Where The Critical Difference enigmatically implies that literature is already
operative within sexuality, Abel suggests [. . .] sexuality is prior to literature” (15).
Barbara Johnson, invoked in the epigraph as an authority whose insight captures the
scope of this special issue, is actually saying something different from what the editor
thinks, and thus, Johnson’s enigmatic presence in the introduction turns a difference
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between into a difference within. It is Barbara Johnson’s presence in the text, more than
the meaning of her words, that produces a deconstructive effect, that makes a
difference by assuring that the first feminist issue of Critical Inquiry, like feminism itself
(contrary to what a special issue on feminism might suggest), isn’t all the same.
Rereading Gallop’s “The Difference Within” with my students this term, and
thinking about this special issue of Differences, I was struck by how Barbara Johnson
functions as an example, not just in Abel’s issue and Gallop’s essay but in so many
other works as well. Although neither Abel nor Gallop is concerned with what Johnson’s
epigraph means, both reveal the profound effects that even a short citation from her
writings can have on our reading of a text. From the beginning, from her first book (The
Critical Difference), Barbara Johnson has served as an example. Yet what she
exemplifies is never quite clear nor is it consistent from one context to another:
deconstruction, feminism, psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, French theory, academic
writing, women in theory, even theory as woman.5 It may be in the very diversity of
these invocations that Barbara Johnson comes to stand for the difference within. Abel’s
early use of Barbara Johnson as an example may well have set the example for others.
Another essay that opens by invoking Barbara Johnson is Diane Elam’s online
essay, “Feminist Theory and Criticism: Poststructuralist Feminisms.” It begins:
“The question of gender is a question of language.” This statement is Barbara
Johnson’s (World 37), and her succinct formulation of the relationship between
gender and language does much to characterize the approach of a group of
feminists who draw upon the discourses of poststructuralism. This feminist work
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takes as its starting point the premise that gender difference dwells in language
rather than in the referent, that there is nothing “natural” about gender itself.
Here Johnson represents a type of feminism rather than deconstruction more generally,
but she still exemplifies the difference within. More to the point, it is her “succinct
formulation of the relationship between gender and language,” just as it is her succinct
formulation of the relationship between sexual difference and literature, that makes her
serve so well as an example for Elam as for Abel.6 In this case, however, the quotation
from Johnson is easily explained, while in Abel’s essay it remains mysterious. But like
Abel, Elam never discusses Johnson’s writings in any detail, and cites her again only in
passing, in a string of references to poststructuralist feminist works.
If the quotation Elam uses to open her essay is a “succinct formulation,” the
quotation Jeffrey Nealon uses to close his book is positively minimalist. Nealon’s
conclusion to Double Reading: Postmodernism after Deconstruction (1993) opens with
an epigraph from Barbara Johnson: “Yes and no (what else?)” (160).7 This
epigrammatic statement creates a similar effect as Abel’s epigraph, for like Abel, Nealon
never mentions Johnson by name nor discusses her work (she’s even missing from the
index, though she does appear in the Works Cited). He does, however, discuss the
meaning of that epigraph in some detail, noting that “yes and no” are “three words that
are expected from a ‘deconstructionist’” (161)—though “what else?”, I would suggest, is
what we expect from Barbara Johnson. So in Nealon’s chapter, Johnson explicitly
serves as an example of deconstruction, as she does implicitly in Abel’s essay. In both
pieces, as Gallop says of Abel’s essay, French male theory is represented by an
American woman writer (15). Again, Johnson’s presence figures the difference within.
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It occurs to me that in a recent article I too have used Barbara Johnson as an
example. In the introductory paragraph (which I quote here in full), I begin with an
anecdote about Barbara Johnson to set up an essay that has nothing to do with
Barbara Johnson, or at least, that never discusses her writing.
In 1990 Barbara Johnson gave a series of lectures at the University of Chicago
on psychoanalysis and African American literature. In those days many feminists
were exploring the question of whether or how post-structuralist theories could be
applied to multicultural literatures. At the time I was an untenured assistant
professor heavily influenced by Johnson's style of deconstruction, so you can
imagine my discomfort when I learned that the second lecture in that series,
entitled "No Passing," was to be a reading of Nella Larsen's Passing, the very
novel I was then writing about in an essay that would turn out to be the inception
of Passing and Pedagogy: The Dynamics of Responsibility (1999). So at the
reception following the first lecture, I cornered Barbara Johnson and anxiously
spewed out all the ideas I was exploring in that essay, seeking to convince her
(and possibly myself) that I hadn't gotten my ideas from her lecture that I hadn't
yet heard. I talked about the nature of our authority, as white feminist critics
trained in a Eurocentric theoretical and literary tradition, in the African American
literature classroom where, as Patricia Hill Collins and Diana Fuss remind us,
knowledge derived from experience is given more credibility than knowledge
acquired through training. How does racial difference inflect the process of
transference that you have helped us to see as central to the pedagogical
relation, I asked her? What does it mean to learn from the one presumed not to
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know, from (so to speak) an unreliable narrator? In response to these questions
that I found so urgent and complicated, Barbara Johnson replied with her
characteristic composure: All I know is, she said, I don't want to be another Carl
Van Vechten. (Caughie 385)
This anecdote sets up my essay about writing and racial difference just as
Johnson’s words set up Abel’s introduction on writing and sexual difference. But neither
of us has any more to say about Johnson in our essays. Still, her work functions as a
powerful presence in both. For what could I possibly mean when I say that I needed to
convince myself that I hadn’t gotten the ideas for my essay from a lecture that I hadn't
yet heard? How could someone’s ideas be so powerful that they could be absorbed
before they were even voiced? That paradoxical statement precisely describes my
relation to Barbara Johnson, and I believe the relation many others have to her work as
well. After all, Abel cites Johnson to capture the scope of her special issue on feminist
criticism even though many readers had not yet read Johnson’s first book, and her more
explicitly feminists books, such as A World of Difference (1987) and The Feminist
Difference (1998), had not yet appeared. Beyond the “apparent” meaning the invocation
of her name suggests, there is, to quote Johnson on language, “a residue of
functioning—which produces effects—that is not a sign of anything” (World 6; original
emphasis).
That Barbara Johnson is so often invoked as an example, and yet never the
example of any one thing, attests to her powerful presence in the academy. At the risk
of exaggerating, I am tempted to say that she may be more often invoked than read,
although, of course, she is invoked only because she has been read. What I mean by
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saying she is invoked more than read is that Johnson’s name carries a certain cachet
that transcends the specificity of her writing, so that she is often cited even when she is
not discussed, yet it is the very specificity of her reading practice that allows her to be
cited as an example of so many critical positions.
Lee Edelman in “’Homographesis’” quotes Barbara Johnson to define
deconstruction and the difference it makes for lesbian and gay theory:
Lesbian and gay critics might do well to consider Barbara Johnson’s description
of a deconstructive criticism that would aim “to elaborate a discourse that says
‘neither/either/or,’ nor ‘both/and,’ nor even ‘neither/nor,’ while at the same time
not totally abandoning these logics either. (741)
Here Johnson comes to exemplify another kind of difference (of sexuality) and another
practice (lesbian criticism). In her essay “Lesbian Spectacles,” Johnson sets herself the
task of reading as a lesbian, a practice she had not previously employed. However, in
doing a lesbian reading of the film The Accused, Johnson realizes that her desire may
well be structured by the very patriarchal power relations that such a reading would
presumably disrupt; for what she finds erotic in the character of Murphy (Kelly McGillis)
is her role as the phallic mother “whose appeal arises from her position in a power
structure” (Feminist 163). Thus, reading as a lesbian may not be liberating or radical,
Johnson says, but may instead expose “the possibility of a real distinction between my
political ideals and my libidinal investments” (164). So while Johnson’s practice is
invoked by Edelman as enabling for gay and lesbian criticism, Johnson’s effort to read
as a lesbian ends up exposing the “political incorrectness” of her fantasy life (163), and
thus functions as another “dis-abel-ing” (or dis-Edel-ing) difference.
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As in Edelman’s citation, Barbara Johnson is most often invoked as an example,
and exemplar, of deconstruction, both an “ideal model” and a “typical specimen” of that
theory. Indeed, Barbara Johnson has come to define the theory. In a recent response to
criticism of The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, Johnson takes issue with
critics who lament the lack of any attempt to define theory in that volume. What they
think of as a weakness Johnson she sees as a strength: "I like the fact that each reader
will have to work with the materials for himself or herself and not be given some
reassuring but ultimately dated and ideological answer" (Responses 471). Yet despite
her resistance to definition, Johnson is frequently cited as offering a succinct definition
of deconstruction. M. H. Abrams and Carl Leggo, among many others, quote the same
passage from The Critical Difference, and slightly modified in her introduction to
Derrida’s Dissemination, specifically identifying it as an “often cited” explanation of the
theory:
The deconstruction of a text does not proceed by random doubt or arbitrary
subversion [generalized skepticism], but by the careful teasing out of warring
forces of signification within the text itself. If anything is destroyed in a
deconstructive reading, it is not meaning but the claim to unequivocal domination
of one mode of signifying over another. (qtd. in Abrams 60; Leggo 187)
It would be no exaggeration to say that passage has been quoted hundreds of times.
Johnson herself repeats this often cited definition in “Teaching Deconstructively” (140141), citing the very passage from her earlier work that has become an authoritative
definition by its frequent citation.8 So is she really so resistant to definition?

8

Well, “yes and no.” If Barbara Johnson has come to define the theory, she does
so not just constatively but performatively. What Johnson does in her writings is to put
deconstructive analysis into practice; she performs performativity, and that creates a
certain amount of undecidability. Her essays, one might say, don’t “mean” but “be”: "'A
poem should not mean/But be' [is] a sentence which disobeys its own prescription,”
writes Johnson, “since, in saying what a poem should do, it is 'meaning' rather than
'being.'" (Feminist 131). In saying what a deconstructive reading should do, Johnson
may be defining rather than doing deconstruction, but the double bind of meaning and
being also calls attention to the very difficulty of teaching or writing about deconstructive
theory: If you perform the theory in specific examples, you risk that your readers or
students won’t get it and that you may be seen to endorse the positions you put into
play in your writing or teaching; if instead you spell out the theory, telling the students or
readers what it is and what they should get, your practice goes against the very practice
you want to teach, and thus you are the one who doesn’t get it.9 Deconstruction, writes
Johnson, “can teach [students] how to work out the logic of a reading on their own
rather than passively deferring to the authority of superior learning” (“Teaching” 141). In
performing deconstruction, then, Johnson puts into question the very authority attributed
to her through her often cited definition.
Given the prominence of The Critical Difference in essays s that use it to define
deconstruction, one of the most interesting examples of the use of Barbara Johnson as
an example is Johnson’s own reading of The Critical Difference. In both the introduction
and the fourth chapter of her second book, A World of Difference, Johnson reads and
critiques her first book, the book that has come to define deconstruction for so many.
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After critiquing the use of gender in male Yale school theorists, Johnson turns to “a Yale
daughter,” Barbara Johnson of The Critical Difference, and finds, surprisingly, that “no
book produced by the Yale School seems to have excluded women so effectively as
The Critical Difference. [. . .] In a book that announces itself as a study of difference, the
place of the woman is constantly being erased” (World 39). Although she does cite
places where the “rhetoric of sexual difference” is depicted, such as the passage cited
in Abel’s epigraph (40), she notes that “woman” is repeatedly erased: “The Critical
Difference may here be unwittingly pointing to ‘woman’ as one of the things ‘we do not
know we do not know’” and thus the book demonstrates “an ignorance that prefaces
Western discourse as a whole” (40-41).10 Thus, The Critical Difference is the example
par excellence of a deconstructive practice, for it both describes and employs the
practice, illustrates and exemplifies the “difference within.” Johnson quotes from The
Critical Difference:
Reading, here, proceeds by identifying and dismantling differences by means of
other differences that cannot be fully identified or dismantled. [. . .] The
differences between entities [. . .] are shown to be based on a repression of the
differences within entities, ways in which an entity differs from itself. But the way
in which a text thus differs from itself is never simple: it has a certain rigorous,
contradictory logic whose effects can, up to a certain point, be read. (qtd. in
World 2; original emphasis)
And beyond that point of readability, those effects produce “a residue of functioning”
(World 6). That Barbara Johnson produces effects that do not signify any one thing
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shows that the way in which a text differs from itself is never simple. Her ubiquitous
citations are the residue of her own readings.
Barbara Johnson so often represents deconstruction in other people’s texts
perhaps because she so eloquently defends it. Throughout her writings Johnson has
explicitly addressed the charges leveled, from both the right and the left, against
deconstruction (and thus implicitly, against herself): its nihilism and its narcissism, its
obscurity and its jargon, its denial of the world outside the text and its inability to engage
in social change.11 And she has risen to these challenges by carefully demonstrating, in
reading after reading, what difference deconstructive concepts of language and writing
make, and how this theory might “equip us to intervene against oppression and injustice
in the world” (World 7). In Mother Tongues, she defends deconstruction’s attention to
the text at the seeming expense of attention to the world:
The danger is that the attention paid to the operation of the signifier will have
necessary referential consequences. While you are parsing a sentence [. . .] you
are not paying attention to what is going on in the world. The question I would
like to ask is whether not paying attention to the signifier automatically keeps you
there. [. . .] Why is the fear of forgetting reality so great? (3; original emphasis).
She even defends bad writing, so often attributed to theorists: “But the real mystery is
why ‘I don’t understand it’ should condemn the author rather than the reader” (Mother
30; original emphasis). Although she also critiques deconstruction, as in her feminist
readings of Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, and J. Hillis Miller, among others, even in
these critiques, Johnson has been the most patient, persistent, and articulate defender
of this theory.12
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She can also stand for something very different, however, stand apart from that
theory, an exception to the rule. The criticisms of deconstruction that Johnson
addresses extend beyond that theory as they have come to be applied to the academy
in general, and to the humanities in particular. In a recent article in The Harvard
Advocate, Jeremy Reff condemns not simply deconstructionists but literature
departments generally for becoming too obscure, too absorbed in their own narrow
interests, and thus unable to reach out to a general audience or to make any
intervention in the world outside the academy. Given the attacks on deconstruction and
Johnson’s identification with that theory, one would think Reff would include Johnson in
this hermetic universe. But no, Barbara Johnson is the one Harvard professor he
exempts from his indictment of literature departments. Here Johnson represents not
obscure theory but engaged work. Reff cites her as an example of interdisciplinary work
that “facilitates communication between differing schools of thought and critical
disciplines,” praising in particular her “generosity and breadth.” In Reff’s essay, Johnson
appears in the company of critics with whom she is rarely aligned, such as Louis
Menand or Lionel Trilling, those who take a critical interest in the world, not just in the
text or in theory, narrowly conceived.
And yet, in her December 2005 essay in the Chronicle of Higher Education,
Lindsay Waters cites Barbara Johnson as an example of a literary scholar who does not
reduce a text to meaning, as one might expect of someone taking a critical interest in
the world and speaking to a general audience. In “Literary Aesthetics: The Very Idea,”
Waters makes Johnson the example par excellence of aesthetic criticism, which Waters
directly links to deconstructive theory and explicitly opposes to the writings of those she
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calls the “meaning-mongers.”13 Revisiting, and reconsidering, the “culture wars,”
Waters states:
What gets lost in this disdain for things “foreign” [French theory] is that theorists
were concerned with the artwork itself, with responding to it on many different
levels — with the aesthetic experience. They wanted to process their own
engagement with a text, finding clues in their difficulties with it to take them deep
into the heart of its darkness. To a critic like Barbara Johnson, the division
between form and content did not exist. (B6-B7)
Later she writes:
Literary theory — as promoted by writers like de Man, Derrida, Johnson, and
Shoshana Felman decades ago had been an effort to devise new defenses for
literature, by updating and developing the idea that the arts proceed in their own
ways, different from those of society, politics, and the economy. The fact that
those theorists have been so eclipsed by the meaning-mongers has been much
heralded as a return to clarity and common sense in literary criticism. (B7)
Waters laments the return to clarity and common sense that Reff favors.
Although she appears to be using Johnson differently from Reff, using her as an
example of the very theory that is often accused of creating the obscurity that separates
literature departments from the general public, Waters actually makes a similar
argument. For both use Johnson as an example of “best practices,” so to speak, the
kind of writing literary scholars should be producing, whether that writing is specifically
literary (for Waters) or generously interdisciplinary (for Reff). Moreover, in reconsidering
the culture wars, Waters says the problem is not French theory but its institutionalization
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in literature departments (those Reff indicts) where critics promoted “a no-nonsense
business, a legalistic parsing of meaning that masks a deep contempt for what a text is
or might be to us” (B6). The reign of interpretation, “the reduction of literature to an idea,
a moral” (B7), is a reaction against “the rebellious, destabilizing, liberating aspects of
art” (B7) that theorists like Johnson are attentive to.
In calling this practice “aesthetic criticism,” however, Waters seems to align
Johnson with the kind of formalism deconstruction came into the academy opposing.
Waters writes that the meaning-monger “rules out of court the most important task of a
critic, which is to discern artistic forms and make judgments about them as things of
beauty or ugliness” (B8). This Kantian aesthetics seems at odds with deconstruction
and its liberating potential. Or is it? Johnson herself raises this question:
Why is the taboo against focusing on rhetorical structures without grounding their
effects in the world so strong? [. . .] [I]t was when I realized that the Nazis were
just as opposed to the play of forms for their own sake as contemporary critics
are—including myself—that I began to wonder why I had bought into the
universal disparagement of Art for Art’s Sake. (Mother 4)
Here Johnson positions herself as both an anti-formalist and a born-again aesthete. But
while she reads texts in terms of their physical effects on the reader, leading Waters to
use her as an example of aesthetic criticism, Johnson never reads to judge them as
things of beauty or ugliness. Still, I think what Waters is getting at when she defines the
task of the aesthetic critic is the necessity of close reading, the practice Johnson
employs so brilliantly.
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So what is Johnson exemplifying in these two works? Are Reff and Waters
responding to the same elements in her writing? Is Johnson an example of the
exception to the rule (the deconstructionist with a conscience, so to speak), or is she an
example because she is a typical specimen (this is what deconstructive theory or
literary criticism really is)? And if the latter, if she were an exemplar because she is
typical or ordinary, would we be honoring her in this special issue?
It strikes me that the relation between Waters’s and Reff’s positions is like the
relation between “aesthetics” and “rapport” that Johnson discusses in Toni Morrison’s
Sula. Aesthetics, she writes, is the “domain of the contemplation of forms, implying
detachment and distance, and rapport is taken as the dynamics of connectedness”
(Feminist 84). Noting scenes where Nel and Sula watch with interest the suffering of
others, Johnson comments that interest (the kind of aesthetic interest that seems to
deny rapport by being absorbed in texts) and disinterest (what Kant attributes to the
realm of aesthetics) are difficult to tell apart (85). What Morrison makes clear, Johnson
continues, is that “the domain of the aesthetic is both profoundly political and impossible
to make politically correct. [. . .] Thus she shows that it is not a matter of choosing
between politics and aesthetics but of recognizing the profoundly political nature of the
inescapability of the aesthetic within personal, political, and historical life” (86-87).
That kind of analysis allows Barbara Johnson to be invoked as an example of
both contemplation and engagement, aesthetics and its deconstruction, theory and
politics, discipline-specific writing and interdisciplinary work. What her readings
demonstrate is “the difficulty of getting any of [our] terms”—such as aesthetics, politics,
theory, feminism—“to settle into reliable starting points for the formulation of ethical or
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moral imperatives” (Wake 68). Just as “literature is already operative within sexuality,”
as Gallop reads Johnson’s epigraph to “Writing and Sexual Difference,” aesthetics is
already operative within politics, as Johnson reads Morrison’s Sula. Political
understanding (rapport) requires close reading (aesthetics).
Perhaps Johnson is persistently called forth to represent both sides because she
consistently refuses to reduce a debate to only two sides. Explaining the double
meaning of her title, The Feminist Difference, Johnson says that on the one hand,
feminism has “made a difference” (3; original emphasis), as evident, for example, in
special journal issues devoted to it as well as in media attacks on it. On the other hand,
“[o]nce women begin to speak, we begin to differ with each other” (3). That difference
within feminism is seen by some feminists as the cause or sign of feminism’s failure,
producing a crisis in feminism. Johnson, in contrast, eschews the narrative of theoretical
or generational strife among feminists and instead puts the blame for feminism's failure
to bring about real change elsewhere—not on feminist differences but on the broader
political and cultural indifference to the institution where feminists have made the most
inroads, the university: “just at the moment when women (and minorities) begin to have
genuine power in the university, American culture responds by acting as though the
university itself is of dubious value” (3). Later she puts this argument slightly differently.
The real differences among women create the “indeterminacy” or “incoherence” in the
very concept of “woman” that is seen to be the ground of feminism. This “lack of fit,” she
says, between the concept and the reality of women is the political problem for
feminism, its very condition of possibility. “Indeterminacy, then, is not the property of a
sign—the word ‘woman’—but the outcome of an analysis and a politics” (193; original
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emphasis). In other words—namely, Patricia Williams’s words—“theoretical [. . .]
understanding and social transformation need not be oxymoronic” (qtd. on 175).
Barbara Johnson quotes these words in her reading of legal theorist Patricia
Williams, responding to a critic of such “jargon-laden” writing who asks, “Why doesn’t
[Williams] simply say that scholars can be activists too?”14 Johnson points out that the
critic thinks she knows what Williams meant to say, but that what Williams is actually
talking about is rhetoric, not reality. Williams’s object of analysis is language and
representation, Johnson says, and “the ways in which they allow certain things to be
sayable and other things erased” (Feminist 176). The critic, she continues, thinks
Williams is or should be addressing readers outside the academy, but, Johnson asks,
does that mean the academy should not be addressed? “If an argument has public
implications, must it conform to a rhetoric of the common reader?” (176) Johnson goes
on to point out that Williams’s writing overall “lays bare the network of constraints and
censorships that attempt to produce ‘plain, readable prose’” (177)—that is, there may be
no such thing as a plain style that is free of discursive or institutional constraints. Yet,
Johnson writes elsewhere, “the moral imperative always occurs as an imperative to
move ‘beyond formalism,’ beyond the questions necessarily raised by the language of
the text” and to the “real” world (World 22).
Just as we cannot choose between politics and aesthetics, we cannot choose
between the academy and the “real” world. In the Introduction to A World of Difference,
after stating that her purpose in this collection is precisely to take the analysis of
difference out of the context of “linguistic universality” and into “contexts in which
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difference is very much at issue in the ‘real world’” (2), she questions that assumed
distinction between theory and the “real world.” Johnson writes:
Nothing could be more commonplace than to hear academics speak of the “real
world” as something lying outside their own sphere of operations. [. . .] Suddenly
it became clear to me that the “real world” was constantly being put in quotation
marks, always being defined as where “we” are not. [. . .] the real world seems to
be the world outside the institution. [. . .] Yet institutions are nothing if not real
articulations of power. (World 3)
As Johnson puts it, paying attention to the signifier, to the play of language—that is,
being interested—is no guarantee that one’s practice will produce effects (World 26),
but not paying attention to the signifier offers no greater guarantee (Mother 3).
Her kind of deconstruction of binary oppositions (such as that between language
and world, theory and practice) allows Barbara Johnson to exemplify different kinds of
practices as well as the practice of deconstructing those differences. The undecidability
between whether she is defining a theory or practicing it, serving as the rule or the
exception, may have something to do with why she is so often invoked but not
explained, cited but not addressed. My analysis here is itself an indirect citation of
Barbara Johnson; for Johnson’s reading of Zora Neale Hurston points to the
impossibility of knowing whether Hurston is “describing a strategy or employing one”
(World 180; original emphasis) in Hurston’s stories about collecting folktales. This
undecidability comes not from any indecisiveness on the part of the writer or the reader,
but, says Johnson, from changing “structures of address”—who’s addressing whom and
why. Thus Barbara Johnson’s own problematic structures of address mirror Hurston’s:
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In preparing to write this chapter [“Thresholds of Difference: Structures of
Address in Zora Neale Hurston”], I found myself repeatedly stopped by conflicting
conceptions of the structure of address into which I was inserting myself. It was
not clear to me what I, a white deconstructor, was doing talking about Zora Neale
Hurson, a black novelist and anthropologist, or to whom I was talking. [. . . ] Was
I talking to white critics, black critics, or myself? (172; original emphasis)
Johnson goes on to say that she found in Hurston’s writing questions she did not know
how to ask. While some critics might dismiss such a tribute as pandering to the other,
here Johnson puts into practice what she states in “Teaching Ignorance”: namely, the
importance of learning from more than one teacher, such as Hurston and de Man.
This is a lesson I had often taught yet had to learn. Fifteen years ago I co-taught
a course in contemporary theory with a colleague from the German department. I vividly
remember our first open dispute in the classroom. My colleague was going over an
essay by a German philosopher in excruciating detail when I interrupted to point out that
he was well into the second half of the seminar, when I was supposed to teach an
essay by Barbara Johnson (appropriately, “Teaching Ignorance”). My colleague looked
up sharply and said, “Surely Barbara Johnson isn’t as important as this primary
theorist.” While I took umbrage at his disparaging remark—not just for putting down a
theorist I admired so much, but in setting up a hierarchy of theorists, relying on the very
binaries our course in poststructuralist theory called into question (e.g., original and
derivative)—I also understood what he meant. Johnson draws explicitly on other
theorists in her writing, such as de Man, Derrida, and Lacan. Thus, to him her ideas
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were not original, were not as worthy of attention as the ideas of those primary theorists
themselves. She wasn’t exemplary but ordinary, not the exception but the rule.
In thinking that way, however, I realized we missed the difference that Johnson’s
writings would teach us. On the one hand, as Johnson writes, “with rare exceptions . . .
the phenomenon of the critical ‘school’ as such” is a “Male School” (World 32), and by
privileging the primary (male) theorist over the derivative (female) one, we had
replicated that gendered structure. But another difference at issue here is that between
ideas and practice, definition and performance, or, in Johnson’s words, the didactic and
the mimetic (81). In privileging the ideas in the male theorist’s essay over the practice in
Johnson’s, we missed the opportunity to critique the very structure of our seminar and
to articulate what was happening in the classroom at that moment. The students were
learning something, but not necessarily the abstruse concepts of the primary theorist.
They were learning to comply “with the contradictory demands of two ardent teachers”
(World 80; original emphasis). In “Teaching Ignorance,” Johnson writes, “Learning
seems to take place most rapidly when the student must respond to the contradiction
between two teachers”—a lesson I frequently cite in my classes but here was putting
into practice, however unconsciously. “And what the student learns,” she continues, “is
both the power of ambiguity and the non-innocence of ignorance” (83). While I may
have felt that defending the female theorist over the priority of the male was a feminist
gesture, Johnson suggests that the feminist practice lies precisely in those “warring
forces of signification”: “To retain the plurality of forces and desire within a structure that
would displace the One-ness of individual mastery could perhaps be labeled a
feminization of authority” (85).
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Teaching Barbara Johnson this term, I was asked by a student, “How do you do
a Johnsonian reading?” I never thought of Barbara Johnson as an adjective, never
thought of myself as consciously imitating her. But I found myself giving this student my
chapter on Nella Larsen’s Passing, the same piece I gave to Barbara Johnson before
she presented her paper on Passing at the University of Chicago lecture series 16 years
ago, the paper that I worried would turn out to be plagiarized from a talk I hadn’t yet
heard. What my anxiety in that University of Chicago lecture hall reveals is my
indebtedness to the writings of Barbara Johnson, how much I have adopted her
language, have taken up her subjects, and have been won over by her ways of moving
through a text. In all I have ever written, it seems to me now, I have tried to follow the
example of Barbara Johnson. But, to adopt her language again here, I wonder how
much any of us can write like Barbara Johnson even as we try to read and write as she
does. At the same time Barbara Johnson serves as an example and an exemplar, she
is also, paradoxically, sui generis, truly one of a kind.
Pamela L. Caughie
Loyola University Chicago
Of course, her first book wasn’t her first publication. Johnson had published deconstructive essays in
Yale French Studies, diacritics, and Studies in Romanticism before 1980.
1

Gallop’s essay appeared in Critical Inquiry the following year (1982) and in Abel’s collection by the same
title, Writing and Sexual Difference (1982). I am using the slightly revised version of Gallop’s response
published in Around 1981.
2

3

Mary Jacobus attributes this concept to Johnson in her contribution to that Critical Inquiry issue (206).

I would also suggest that the first part of Abel’s sentence invokes Barbara Johnson, for The Critical
Difference is an example of “female talent grappling with a male tradition.”
4

I’m thinking here of her Bucknell lecture series that she discusses in The Wake of Deconstruction,
where the poster advertising her lecture bore Joshua Reynolds’s representation of theory as a woman.
5
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6

It may well be the very succinctness of her formulations that makes her an example. In A Glossary of
Literary Terms (1999), for example, M. H. Abrams refers to Johnson’s famous quotation (discussed
below) as a “succinct statement” of what deconstruction (60).
7

Johnson explains where this enigmatic epigraph comes from in The Wake of Deconstruction (53).

That same passage is cited as well in the Introduction to the collection in which Johnson’s essay
appears: “Among the most helpful and useful definitions of deconstruction is … that of Barbara Johnson,
who characterizes it as ‘the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text’” (Atkins
and Johnson 2). René Wellek cites this passage in “The New Nihilism in Literary Studies” as does
Jonathan Culler in On Deconstruction (213) and again in Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction (127).
Indeed, sometimes the phrase is attributed to Culler, as in Sam Solecki’s review essay, or cited without
attribution, as in the abstract of Nancy Miller’s ’What difference does difference make?’: The Creative
Deconstructions of Jean Rhys and Aimé Césaire.” A Google search of the keywords in this passage turns
up around 508 hits, though not all of these are references to Johnson’s definition.
8

9

I describe the difficulty of performativity in these terms in Passing and Pedagogy (95-96).

10

Similarly, in the Introduction Johnson acknowledges that her discussion of differences in that first book
“was taking place entirely within the sameness of the white male Euro-American literary, philosophical,
psychoanalytical, and critical canon” (World 2).
Her most explicit treatment of these charges is in A World of Difference, Part I: “The Fate of
Deconstruction.”
11

12

See, for example, Part I of A World of Difference. Johnson, as we will see, has also critiqued her own
examples of deconstructive reading.
13

Johnson challenges meaning-mongers in The Wake of Deconstruction when she analyzes the
“resistance to opening up meaning as a question” and the “ideology of the law review style” that attempts
“to create a world saturated with meaning, intention, and consciousness” (39).
14

This question reminds me of a line from Gertrude Stein. During her 1934 U.S. lecture series, someone
asked her, “Why don’t you write the way you talk?” and Stein replied, “Why don’t you read the way I
write?” (cited in “Loving Repeating: A Musical of Gertrude Stein”).
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